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Advances in neuroscience have dramatically expanded our knowledge of 
the brain and how it operates.  Although many mysteries remain, the early 
architectures of our understanding have already left impressions on the legal 
system.  Neuroscientific evidence has been offered to support claims by 
litigants in both civil and criminal cases, ranging from broad-based 
generalities (such as “juvenile brains are generally immature in these ways”) 
to individualized opinions (such as “this defendant lacked the cognitive 
capacity to control this behavior”). 
As such evidence trickles into the courts, scholars have debated the 
scientific foundation of such claims, the scope of their applicability, and 
whether such evidence has met some threshold of reliability imposed before 
courts and fact-finders ought to accept them.1  But most scholarly treatments 
of neuroscientific proof overlook a more fundamental question regarding 
evidentiary admissibility:  What impact will the standard applied to 
determine admission—both de jure and de facto—have on the rate of 
acceptance of this new evidence?  History suggests that, when it comes to 
proffers of scientific evidence, civil and criminal proceedings are not in fact 
created equal.  Moreover, the application of evidentiary standards varies 
widely, and constitutional oversight of evidentiary rules is, for litigants other 
than a criminal defendant, somewhere between threadbare and nonexistent. 
 
*  Professor, New York University School of Law.  I am grateful to Professor Deborah Denno 
and the participants of the Fordham Law Review’s symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and 
the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide, held at Fordham University School of Law, 
for their helpful feedback and inspiring comments in connection with this Article.  I owe 
thanks to Ayelet Evrony and Peter Varlan, who provided superb research assistance, as well 
as to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund, which supported this 
work.  For an overview of the symposium, see Deborah W. Denno, Foreword:  Criminal 
Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 
(2016). 
 
 1. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 20:3–:17 (2015); Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the 
Double-Edged Sword:  An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 493, 499 (2015); see also Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral 
Genetics in US Criminal Law:  An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485, 491 (2016) 
(disputing that neuroscientific evidence is used exclusively and largely unsuccessfully in 
capital mitigation hearings, but reporting one study that shows that it is largely used, with 
success, in that context). 
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This Article thus speculates on the course of neuroscience-as-proof with 
an eye toward the actual admissibility standards that will govern the 
acceptance of such evidence by courts, not just as a matter of formal law but 
also as a function of historical custom.  Given the legal system’s spotty record 
with scientific evidence—which is to say, both the demonstrated willingness 
of the system to admit unproven “science” or to exclude evidence despite a 
seemingly adequate scientific foundation—the trajectory of neuroscience in 
the courts cannot be predicted simply by asking about its scientific legitimacy 
in the abstract.  Rather, an observer must ponder whether patterns of 
admissibility long evident in criminal and civil courts will persevere with 
respect to neuroscientific proof. 
One clarification is warranted.  Throughout this Article, I use the phrases 
“novel neuroscience” and “novel neuroscientific evidence.”  Capturing 
precisely what is meant by “neuroscience,” much less “novel neuroscience,” 
can often prove more elusive than seems at first glance. 
I generally follow Professor Nita Farahany’s approach, which prefers the 
word “neurobiological” to capture “evidence about the study of the brain and 
the nervous system,” which includes “claims about the ‘normal’ brain, 
abnormal brain, effects on neurotransmitters, brain structure, function, and 
genetic contributions to neurological functioning and structure.”2   Professor 
Farahany’s definition also broadly encompasses evidence based on imaging 
techniques (such as CT or MRI), as well as findings drawn from interviews 
(intended to elicit, for instance, whether a person had a brain injury) or 
psychological assessments.3 
I further circumscribe this category to “novel neuroscience.”  By this, I 
mean to exclude relatively noncontroversial uses of neuroscience, such as 
those that show an undisputed physical insult or injury to the brain, or its 
fairly noncontroversial consequence, like a car accident that results in visible 
damage to a portion of the brain affecting speech, where the injured person 
developed precisely that expected speech impairment.  I also intend to 
exclude assessments that have only remote connection to the physical 
condition of the brain, such as psychological assessments that have no 
connection to any observed physiological conditions.  In short, I mainly 
intend to speak to precisely what the phrase suggests:  novel or cutting-edge 
methods—whether scan-based or assessment-based—that purport to link a 
finding about the structure or physiological function of the brain to a 
manifested behavior, cognitive power, or psychology.  Moreover, this Article 
considers the likely treatment of novel neuroscientific evidence when offered 
in courts at this moment in scientific understanding; in other words, it does 
not assume any game-changing breakthroughs on what may reliably be 
proven. 
Part I begins by recounting the historical divide between civil and criminal 
courts with respect to the treatment of novel scientific evidence.  Part II then 
explores, both by examining current trends and predicting future trajectories, 
 
 2. Farahany, supra note 1, at 2 n.3. 
 3. Id. at 10. 
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whether this pattern of differential treatment is likely to endure as courts 
begin to confront the admissibility of novel neuroscience. 
I.  DAUBERT’S TWO FACES:  CIVIL V. CRIMINAL 
The formal standard for admission of expert evidence may, as a matter of 
formal law, be the same in civil and criminal cases.  But in practice, both 
scholars and litigants have observed that the application of that standard 
varies markedly.  The conventional wisdom holds, and empirical studies 
support, that evidence proffered by plaintiffs in civil cases receives harsh 
scrutiny for reliability, whereas evidence proffered by prosecutors in criminal 
cases typically gets a free pass.  But, as explained in this part, this disparity 
is rarely observed directly because apart from a couple of exceptions—most 
notably fire science and handwriting analysis—the type of evidence offered 
by civil litigants has little overlap with that offered by criminal prosecutors. 
A.  Background 
When announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993, Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 was heralded as a watershed moment in the 
treatment of scientific evidence.5  In its opinion, the Court displaced the 
longstanding Frye v. United States6 “general acceptance” test (“the Frye 
test”) as the standard for evidentiary admissibility.  With the Court’s opinions 
in General Electric Co. v. Joiner7 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael8 that 
quickly followed, the Supreme Court seemed to erect an entirely new and 
more rigorous test for admissibility intended to stem the perceived epidemic 
of “junk science” that had overtaken the courts.9 
But even in the midst of this celebration, suspicions began circulating that 
Daubert’s professed commitment to rigorous examination of evidence 
offered in civil cases—like the one in which the ruling was announced—
would not extend to its criminal brethren.  For instance, the opinion itself, 
which talked breathlessly about the scientific ideal of “reliability” in ways 
later criticized by philosophers of science,10 conspicuously omitted any 
reference to the forensic sciences that routinely arose in criminal courts.  
 
 4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 5. See, e.g., Leslie Morsek, Comment, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life!  The Ups, 
the Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to 
Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence:  Kumho’s Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L. 
REV. 689, 704 (2001).  
 6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 7. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 8. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 9. The iconic text that influenced this view was written by Peter W. Huber. See PETER 
W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE:  JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (1991) (warning that 
“any self-styled scientist, no matter how strange or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to 
testify in court”). 
 10. See, e.g., David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?:  The 
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 
690, 703–09 (2000) (critiquing the opinion’s “limited framework” for understanding the 
scientific enterprise). 
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Then, on remand, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, palpably 
bristling at the “daunting” task of acting as an arbiter of scientific 
reliability,11 took pains to exempt “[f]ingerprint analysis, voice recognition, 
DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other scientific endeavors closely tied to 
law enforcement” from Daubert’s strictures, setting up a de facto divide 
between civil and criminal Daubert.12 
In the years since the Daubert trilogy—which also witnessed amendments 
to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that either codified or enhanced 
its standards, depending on whom you ask13—the debate over Daubert’s 
impact has continued.  Such findings have political and not just legal 
significance because in both civil and criminal cases, the methods and 
techniques most vulnerable to Daubert scrutiny, as judged by scientific 
standards, tend to be offered by only one side in the litigation.  And in fact, 
those parties even sit on the same side of the courtroom:  prosecutors in 
criminal cases and plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil cases.  That is, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, such as in toxic tort or personal injury cases, often rest their proof 
on medical or scientific findings that are readily challenged as unreliable by 
defendants.14  Similarly, prosecutors in criminal cases routinely offer 
evidence based on methods like fingerprinting, hair and fiber analysis, or 
pattern matching (like ballistics or bite marks), notwithstanding reliable 
indicators that such evidence is in fact wholly lacking in scientific support.15 
Even though “Daubert ostensibly applies in the same way in criminal and 
civil cases, social scientists have increasingly raised the issue whether courts, 
in fact, apply Daubert more lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in 
regard to prosecution evidence.”16  Given that the proponents of vulnerable 
scientific evidence tend to hew to one side, the degree to which Daubert 
works to exclude such science carries important repercussions for 
measurements of plaintiff and prosecutorial success.  Thus, multiple 
empirical studies have endeavored to answer precisely whether Daubert has, 
in fact, served its role of precluding junk science while admitting reliable, 
even if cutting-edge or novel, techniques.17 
Generally speaking, these studies themselves divide between civil and 
criminal cases.  And they seem to reaffirm, albeit imperfectly, the intuition 
of litigants and those familiar with the justice system:  “civil defendants win 
 
 11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 12. Id. at 1317 n.5.  
 13. Note, Admitting Doubt:  A New Standard for Scientific Evidence, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
2021, 2024 & nn.24–25 (2010) (collecting sources on opposing sides of the debate). 
 14. See, e.g., Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito, Et Tu, Plaintiffs?:  An Empirical Analysis 
on Daubert’s Effect on Plaintiffs, and Why Gatekeeping Standards Matter (a Lot), 66 ARK. L. 
REV. 975, 984–85 & n.47 (2013) (canvassing studies estimating high rates of expert evidence, 
in reporting on findings about plaintiff and defendant filing and removal behavior in light of 
the evidentiary standard). 
 15. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  A PATH FORWARD 11 (2009). 
 16. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes:  The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities 
and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 SW. 
U. L. REV. 699, 716 (2008). 
 17. See, e.g., supra note 9; infra notes 24–25. 
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their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers most of the time, 
and . . . criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges 
to government proffers.”18  In short, “civil defendants have benefited greatly 
from Daubert but . . . criminal defendants have not.”19 
One iconic comparison was conducted by Professor Michael Risinger in 
2000.  He looked at over 1,600 citations to Daubert by American state and 
federal courts, in a period from 1993 to 1999, and compared that to a 
reference set of opinions citing Frye in the six years prior to Daubert.20  He 
found that post-Daubert, courts excluded plaintiffs’ proffered evidence at 
high rates, even while granting plaintiffs’ requests to exclude defense 
evidence at much lower rates.21  On the criminal side, he found that defense 
challenges to prosecution evidence infrequently succeeded, even while 
prosecution challenges to defense evidence had roughly the same success rate 
as that of civil defendants.22 
Professor Risinger’s findings have been replicated by others using an array 
of approaches.23  Those findings show that in the civil context, generally 
speaking, “studies show that after Daubert, parties challenged the 
admissibility of evidence more frequently, and judges scrutinized evidence 
more carefully, excluding a greater proportion of it.”24  In contrast, in the 
criminal context, one major review found that questioned experts tended to 
testify for the prosecution, and “the Daubert decision did not impact on the 
admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial or the appellate court 
levels.”25 
Some observers might wonder whether these findings simply reflect the 
relative substantive merit of evidence offered by civil plaintiffs versus 
criminal prosecutors.  Indeed, if it simply is the case that prosecutors offer 
robust, reliable techniques, whereas civil plaintiffs tend to offer novel, 
untested methods, then these findings simply show that the standard is 
performing as expected.  But regardless of the merits of plaintiffs’ 
 
 18. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability:  Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000). 
 19. Id. at 143. 
 20. Id. at 102–04. 
 21. Id. at 143–49, app. 
 22. Id. at 143–49. 
 23. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 11; Paul C. Giannelli, 
Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 3 (2011). 
 24. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation:  What Empirical Studies Tell 
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 109–10, 126–37 & nn.3–4 (2000) 
(reviewing and citing studies); see also Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert 
Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S64 (2005) (citing studies that show that “judges are 
much more likely since Daubert to scrutinize expert testimony before trial and then to limit or 
exclude expert testimony” in civil cases, although “courts are not applying Daubert stringently 
in the criminal context”); Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal 
Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2005). But see 
Andrew Jurs, Gatekeeper with a Gavel:  A Survey Evaluating Judicial Management of 
Challenges to Expert Reliability and Their Relationship to Summary Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 
325, 335–38 (2014) (reviewing prior studies and noting greater degrees of uncertainty). 
 25. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 (2002). 
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evidence—which is a subject of some debate—that conjecture does not bear 
out with respect to prosecutorial evidence.  Consider that nearly all of the 
common forensic techniques offered by prosecutors, and routinely admitted 
by courts, have been repeatedly denounced as lacking in any scientific 
basis.26  Most prominently, a 2009 National Academy of Sciences report 
observed that 
[w]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source. . . .  The simple reality is that the interpretation 
of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine 
its validity.27 
Indeed, some criminal courts admitting forensic evidence despite defense 
challenges to reliability have expressly conceded that the proposed 
conclusions lack any scientific basis in data, methods, or statistical 
significance—and yet nonetheless embraced them citing nothing more than 
their longstanding pedigree.28 
In sum, commentators, scholars, and courts themselves seem to 
acknowledge that there exists a Daubert double standard.  Professor Jane 
Moriarty has further intimated that this double standard is not just the product 
of incompetence or lack of understanding.29  She notes that 
[i]n civil cases, courts seem quite up to the task of evaluating microbiology, 
teratology, and toxicology evidence, discussing both science and statistics 
with plenty of acumen.  Yet when it comes to evaluating the shortcomings 
of lip prints and handwriting, courts are unable to muster the most minimal 
grasp of why a standardless form of comparison might lack evidentiary 
reliability or trustworthiness.30 
This intuition is perhaps bolstered by efforts to expressly enshrine the 
distinction.  In the wake of Daubert, federal lawmakers circulated a bill to 
exempt criminal evidence from the proposed codification of the Daubert test, 
but their efforts failed.31  That suggests that political actors, or at least some 
legislators, would expressly aim to lower the bar of reliability for evidence 
admitted in criminal cases.  But whether de facto or de jure, the bottom line 
seems that, whatever Daubert’s bark, it tends to bite only in civil cases. 
 
 26. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science:  Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 315 (2008) (surveying disciplines like bite marks, handwriting, and ballistics). 
 27. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 28. See, e.g., Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 892 n.12 
(2013). 
 29. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?:  The NAS Report on Forensic 
Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299. 
 30. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). 
 31. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995).  Georgia, however, still maintains some distinction. 
See Seaman, supra note 28, at 891 & n.9 (citing a provision that reads:  “In criminal 
proceedings, the opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions 
shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other 
witnesses” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (2011))). 
2016] THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DAUBERT DIVIDE 625 
B.  Exceptions 
The disparate treatment of proffered scientific evidence in the civil and 
criminal context is easily masked in part because the disciplines relied upon 
in each context diverge so sharply.  In the civil context, experts tend to offer 
opinions about causal factors of injury or illness.32  In the criminal context, 
by contrast, experts tend to be less concerned with causation and more 
focused on identification.33  The civil cases are littered with examples of 
doctors, epidemiologists, and social scientists offering medical and 
mechanical explanations,34 whereas the criminal cases consist largely of 
devoted forensic analysts—often police department employees—discussing 
methods like fingerprinting, trace evidence identification, handwriting 
analysis, and the like.35 
Even scientific disciplines that may, on the surface, appear to apply in both 
civil and criminal contexts do not upon closer examination.  For instance, 
DNA typing is a scientific technique that obviously carries great import for 
criminal cases as an identification method, and it is also easy to imagine that 
it might be relevant in a civil case involving genetic testing of some kind.  
But, for reasons that are too complex to detail in this Article, the methods, 
instrumentation, and interpretive difficulties of DNA testing in each context 
are in fact quite different.36  Even DNA testing in civil parentage cases—the 
closest analogue to the criminal context—diverges significantly from the 
kinds of reliability challenges that arise in criminal forensic testing.  To give 
just one example, parentage testing always involves controlled quality and 
quantity samples taken from known individuals (the putative parents or the 
child), whereas forensic testing focuses on crime scene samples from 
unknown persons collected in uncontrolled conditions that may be of low 
quality or quantity.37 
There are, however, two disciplines that form an area of overlap between 
civil and criminal cases and thus might directly surface the conflict between 
civil and criminal admissibility standards.  Specifically, fire investigation is 
relevant for both criminal arson and civil insurance cases, and handwriting 
analysis is pertinent for both criminal cases and civil cases.  These two areas 
thus provide good source material against which to test the thesis that courts 
apply admissibility standards more strictly in civil cases (to evidence offered 
by plaintiffs) than in criminal cases (to evidence offered by prosecutors). 
 
 32. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (reporting on 
findings from a study of California courts). 
 33. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 36 (noting that forensic 
analysis typically aims for identification, individualization, association and reconstruction). 
 34. Gross, supra note 32, at 1119. 
 35. Jennifer Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 759–60, 774 (2011) (discussing the lack of training of analysts and 
institutional relationship between forensic laboratories and police departments). 
 36. See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL:  THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA 4–5 (2015) 
(listing differences between medical and forensic DNA testing). 
 37. See id. at 4. 
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A 2013 article by Professor Julie Seaman probed a version of this 
question.38  Professor Seaman sought to answer whether the same discipline 
(fire science or handwriting analysis) received different treatment depending 
on the kind of case (civil versus criminal).39  In a review that she conceded 
faced some methodological challenges,40 she made some interesting 
findings.  In short: 
Comparing the admission and exclusion percentages in criminal and civil 
cases, then, it is apparent that the disparity seen in the handwriting cases is 
not evident in the fire cause and origin cases. In the handwriting cases, 
prosecution evidence was admitted in nearly 90% of the criminal cases, 
whereas on the civil side it was admitted (or at least not excluded) in fewer 
than 40% of cases.  In contrast, the admission rates for expert testimony in 
the fire cases hovered close to 75% for both criminal and civil cases.41 
On its face, these findings present a conflicting image.42  But examined more 
closely, they reaffirm and deepen the initial underlying premise:  it depends 
as much on the offering party as it does on the type of case.  In criminal cases 
involving fire science, the prosecution (the favored party) tends to offer the 
evidence, and so we would expect high rates of admission.  In civil cases, 
however, it is not only plaintiffs that offer this evidence but rather civil 
defendants as well; fire science experts tend to be used by defendant-insurers 
who seek to defend against claims lodged by plaintiff-insureds.43  Thus, if 
the evidence is admitted in civil cases at high rates, it may very well be 
because it is offered by the favored party in those cases—the defendant. 
By contrast, the cases involving handwriting analysis fit the more typical 
picture.  Handwriting analysis tends to be offered by the prosecution in the 
criminal context and by plaintiffs in the civil context.44  And again, Seaman 
found that in criminal cases, the admission rate was around 90 percent, 
whereas the exclusion rate in civil cases was roughly 64 percent.45  
Importantly, in looking at the qualitative language used in these cases to 
discuss the admission or exclusion determination, Seaman found marked 
variation in the perspective of judges: 
Whereas in criminal cases, for the most part, the global field of questioned 
document analysis is one with a long history, tested in the crucible of the 
 
 38. See Seaman, supra note 28. 
 39. Id. at 898. 
 40. Id. at 897–99. 
 41. Id. at 907–08. 
 42. Of course, there is also the question of whether fire science is more rigorous than 
handwriting analysis and thus deserving of admission.  Certainly some aspects of fire 
investigation can lay substantially more claim to scientific legitimacy than handwriting 
analysis.  However, fire science unfortunately has been marked by a longstanding history of 
experts whose conclusions rest more on myth and folklore than on scientific truth. See 
generally Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited:  Percolation 
Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 483, 485–95 (2016). 
 43. Seaman, supra note 28, at 904, 907. 
 44. In Professor Seaman’s sample, in all but one of the criminal cases the evidence was 
offered by the prosecution, and in civil cases nearly all were offered by the plaintiff. Id. at 899. 
 45. See id. at 901, 908. 
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adversarial process and relied upon by law enforcement and 
overwhelmingly approved by courts, in civil cases the field is peopled by 
unqualified charlatans who use untested methodologies to offer unreliable 
opinions that are not helpful to juries, which are perfectly capable of 
comparing handwriting samples on their own.46 
In short, although handwriting analysis or fire science evidence arises in both 
the criminal and civil contexts, when it comes to judging the admissibility of 
the proffered evidence, each discipline’s rate of success follows the same 
pattern of admission and exclusion apparent from studies about the rigor of 
Daubert when it comes to nonoverlapping fields.  When faced with evidence 
offered by prosecutors or civil defendants, courts tend to take a generous 
approach, whereas even the same kind of evidence offered by civil plaintiffs 
is met with great skepticism. 
II.  THE NEW KID ON THE BLOCK:  
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Given the conventional wisdom, borne out by empirical study, that 
Daubert bites in civil cases but merely barks in criminal ones, how might we 
expect courts to treat the impending onslaught of neuroscientific evidence?  
Like handwriting analysis and fire investigation, novel neuroscience creates 
a point of tension because it can arise in both categories of cases and be 
introduced by either side in a dispute.  Specifically, novel neuroscientific 
methods, such as those used to detect closed brain injuries or subtle cognitive, 
emotional, or psychological conditions, have cross-applications that make 
them more like handwriting analysis than like side-specific methods such as 
idiopathic mesothelioma or bite marks.  If novel neuroscience extends 
beyond its present reach—most commonly to capital criminal defendants and 
to a lesser extent to civil plaintiffs—and becomes part of the prosecutorial 
and perhaps even civil defendants’ arsenal,47 what will happen?  Novel 
neuroscientific evidence may present the law with the direct point of conflict 
that it has henceforth averted:  the context and side-specific treatment of 
scientific evidence, whether civil versus criminal cases or plaintiffs and 
prosecutors versus defendants.  And from that conflict, observers may gain a 
clearer sense of the successes and failures of our evidentiary admissibility 
standard. 
What will be the result of this point of conflict?  Will admissibility 
standards operate to preclude novel neuroscientific evidence, and, if so, in 
what kinds of cases and by which parties?  Will neuroscience admissibility 
patterns reflect the same political story recounted above, or will they cleave 
between prosecutorial evidence and plaintiffs’ evidence as hinted at by the 
findings in the handwriting example?  Will pressure to reconcile these 
admissibility decisions result in the forging of some new equilibrium?  It is 
 
 46. Id. at 900. 
 47. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE 730, 730 (2013) 
(“In . . . a steadily increasing number of similar cases in both criminal and civil courts, 
neuroscientific evidence has been introduced to support a party’s legal claim as well as to 
argue its irrelevance or invalidity (by the opposing party).”). 
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too early to know, but the remainder of this Article will consider current 
trends and explore several possibilities. 
A.  Current Trends 
In both civil and criminal cases, neuroscientific evidence commonly has 
been introduced to support noncontroversial findings such as structural 
damage or major brain injury, easily readable on a standard CT or MRI 
scan.48  Although such findings are not without challenge, they tend to be 
relatively noncontroversial.  The novel neuroscientific proof of interest to this 
Article, however, is that which relies on contested questions such as the 
degree to which conclusions can be drawn about a single individual from 
aggregated group data,49 the relationship between cause and effect, the 
absence of baseline data about a subject’s brain prior to trauma,50 or the 
ascertainment of disputable injuries or abnormalities.51  These developments 
raise some degree of alarm on the part of scientists when applied in a context 
of categorical decision making—such as the recent Supreme Court decision 
citing neuroscience about juveniles as a basis for a wholesale prohibition on 
the death penalty or mandatory life without parole for that group52—but the 
most contested use continues to be to support findings individualized to a 
specific person. 
In civil cases, plaintiffs most commonly offer novel neuroscientific 
evidence for one of three different purposes:  (1) to show brain injury, in 
particular closed head injuries; (2) to prove the existence of toxic 
encephalopathy or other chemical sensitivities; and (3) for lie detection.53  In 
criminal cases, novel neuroscientific evidence is typically admitted at the 
request of the defendant in support of arguments to mitigate punishment, 
most often in serious sentencing hearings like capital cases.54 
 
 48. Stephen J. Morse, Introduction, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, 
at xv (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013). 
 49. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to 
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014). 
 50. See, e.g., OWEN JONES, JEFFREY SCHALL & FRANCIS SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
28 (2014); A. Philip Dawid, David L. Faigman & Stephen E. Fienberg, Fitting Science into 
Legal Contexts:  Assessing Effects of Causes or Causes of Effects?, 43 SOC. METHODS & RES. 
359 (2014). 
 51. JONES, SCHALL & SHEN, supra note 50, at 269–302. 
 52. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005). 
 53. See generally 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 20:1–:63. 
 54. Two major surveys both reached the same conclusion. See Denno, supra note 1, at 
493 (“My analysis reveals that neuroscience evidence is usually offered to mitigate 
punishments in the way that traditional criminal law has always allowed, especially in the 
penalty phase of death penalty trials.”); Farahany, supra note 1, at 7 (conceding that 
neurobiological evidence is used most often in criminal cases for mitigation purposes, but 
claiming that it also is gaining ground in other areas, such as competency determinations or 
capacity defenses).  Professor Farahany’s findings of usage beyond just mitigation hinge in 
large part on a more capacious definition of “what ‘counts’ . . . as neurobiological evidence,” 
because her study includes any reference to medical history of brain trauma or interviews 
aimed at determining such history and not just scans or physical evidence of brain injury. Id. 
at 10. 
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Thus far, courts’ response to neuroscientific evidence when offered for 
these purposes has been tentative and inconsistent.  Courts have shown the 
greatest enthusiasm for admitting evidence offered by capital defendants 
seeking to fight a sentence of death by showing brain conditions that mitigate 
their criminal responsibility.  In this context, courts have admitted 
neuroscientific evidence to bolster claims of behavioral or emotional 
disorders,55 the absence of a culpable mental state or evidence of insanity,56 
and diminished cognitive capacity.57  But it is only the use of neuroscientific 
evidence in the mitigation phase that has become genuinely common—so 
common, in fact, that appellate judges have even found that failure to 
investigate neuroscientific explanations for behavior constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel.58 
In civil cases, judges have shown greater recalcitrance about admitting 
novel neuroscientific proof, although there are occasional exceptions.  For 
instance, although courts routinely admit established technologies like CT, 
PET, and MRI scans as proof of major structural damage to a brain, they have 
not always welcomed such evidence when offered to prove the existence or 
cause of minor closed-head brain trauma (often abbreviated “TBI” for 
“traumatic brain injury”).59  There are a handful of examples to the contrary, 
but courts still typically exhibit significant reservation about allowing in such 
evidence.  When it comes to cutting-edge methods like QEEG or SPECT,60 
as well as novel findings such as toxic encephalopathy61 or lack of 
truthfulness (lie detection),62 courts have overwhelmingly rejected such 
proffered evidence as unreliable. 
Of course, broader applications of neuroscientific evidence are easily 
imaginable.  As succinctly laid out by one group of authors, neuroscientific 
evidence could answer questions as wide ranging as: 
[I]s this person responsible for his behaviour?  What was this person’s 
mental state at the time of the act?  How much capacity did this person have 
to act differently?  What are the effects of addiction, adolescence or 
advanced age on one’s capacity to control behaviour?  How competent is 
this person?  What does this person remember?  How accurate is this 
person’s memory?  What are the effects of emotion on memory, behaviour 
and motivation?  Is this person telling the truth?  In how much pain is this 
person?  How badly injured is this person’s brain?63 
Although there are occasional examples of courts admitting novel 
neuroscientific evidence in support of some of these outlier propositions, in 
 
 55. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 20:11. 
 56. See id. §§ 20:12–:13; see also Farahany, supra note 1, at 19. 
 57. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 20:10. 
 58. See Farahany, supra note 1, at 21. 
 59. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 20:4. 
 60. See id. §§ 20:5–:6.  QEEG and SPECT, short for quantitative electroencephalogram 
and single-photon emission computerized tomography, respectively, are neuroimaging 
methods. Id. 
 61. See id. § 20:7. 
 62. See id. §§ 20:8, :16. 
 63. Jones et al., supra note 47, at 730. 
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general courts find such evidence unreliable under a Daubert, Frye, or other 
pertinent standard.64 
In sum, courts in civil cases tend to reject novel neuroscientific evidence 
unless it supports fairly solid-seeming claims of traumatic brain injury, and 
in criminal cases, courts express similar reluctance to admit evidence unless 
it is offered as mitigation evidence.  But when so offered, and in particular as 
capital mitigation, courts tend to take a more permissive view of 
admissibility. 
B.  Future Directions 
What do these early patterns of neuroscientific admissibility patterns 
predict for the future?  This part, of necessity, constitutes pure speculation.  
But for the sake of argument, let us presume two things.  First, assume that 
in the near term, claimants will continue to proffer neuroscientific evidence, 
and courts will continue to face challenges on the basis of scientific validity.  
In other words, do not expect that these early defeats will dissuade litigants 
from continued efforts to utilize neuroscientific evidence.  Second, assume 
that the state of the science continues to improve.  Methods become more 
robust and technologies advance.  Thus, while still fraught, such findings 
refine incrementally in terms of specificity and sensitivity.  What might we 
expect the arc of admissibility to look like, knowing what we do about the 
courts’ track record when it comes to novel or unproven scientific 
techniques? 
1.  A Ban:  Novel Neuroscience 
Goes the Way of the Polygraph 
One possibility is that neuroscientific evidence will continue to meet broad 
resistance by courts, which will remain skeptical of its reliability and mindful 
of the numerous cautions sounded by scientists who aim to curb efforts of 
overclaiming.65  Under this view, the current trends of excluding novel 
neuroscientific evidence in the vast majority of civil and criminal cases will 
continue, with perhaps a small pocket of admission when offered by defense 
in mitigation proceedings (more on that later).  The enthusiasm of proponents 
of neuroscience will thus ultimately be checked by courts, which will strictly 
apply the standards of evidentiary admissibility and deem most methods 
insufficiently reliable. 
Evidence of this kind of skepticism is already apparent in existing civil 
cases, where plaintiffs, generally speaking, have failed when proffering in 
evidence a wide array of uses of novel neuroscience.66  It is also to some 
degree evident in the criminal cases, where defendants outside of the 
mitigation context tend to meet similar skepticism.  Indeed, fears about 
prosecutorial overreaching, the usurpation of the jury function, and “trial by 
 
 64. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 20:5–:8. 
 65. See, e.g., JONES ET AL., supra note 50, at 731 (describing worries about judicial misuse 
of neuroscientific evidence). 
 66. See supra Part II.A. 
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machine” might further work to stem the tide in criminal cases.  Thus, going 
against the conventional practice of imposing stricter admissibility tests on 
plaintiffs than on prosecutors, courts might simply reject novel neuroscience 
altogether. 
Such a result would not be unprecedented.  For instance, when ordinary lie 
detector tests first came to market, there existed a similar fervor that such 
tests offered a scientifically certain means of resolving law’s recurring 
problem of assessing human credibility.67  But the tool proved quite useful 
to defendants because it offered “scientific” validation of their honesty.68  In 
fact, it was offered for just that purpose in Frye, the landmark case that 
announced the reliability standard that dominated American law for decades, 
and the court ruled it insufficiently reliable on the grounds that it had not yet 
gained general acceptance.69 
But lie detection methods did not fade.  Defense lawyers continued to 
argue their applicability for purposes other than formal admission as 
evidence.70  Nevertheless, in the wake of Frye, “[t]he vast majority of courts 
maintained a per se inadmissibility rule.”71  Then, as polygraph technology 
improved, and the Supreme Court laid down the Daubert standard, there was 
a resurgence in hope that the polygraph might return to court.72  By this point, 
law enforcement had routinely relied on polygraphs for making charging and 
other decisions, so it seemed that the method might gain greater favor.  
Indeed, polygraph machines arguably have a stronger scientific foundation 
than numerous other forensic methods—such as bite mark or tool mark 
matching—that have earned widespread acceptance in criminal courts.73  Yet 
even when revisited in the wake of Daubert, polygraphs still could not make 
it into court.74  To be fair, some of those judgments turned on concerns other 
 
 67. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 18 
(2003) (“In popular culture and media, the polygraph device is often represented as a magic 
mind-reading machine.  These facts reflect the widespread mystique or belief that the 
polygraph test is a highly valid technique for detecting deception . . . .”). 
 68. The sense that polygraphs seem to favor criminal defendants is evident in the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual, which instructs prosecutors to seek to exclude polygraph evidence.  5 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 9, no. 262 (3d ed. 2015) (outlining arguments for attorneys on 
exclusion). 
 69. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 70. See, e.g., Charles W. Daniels, Using Polygraph Evidence After Scheffer (pt. 2), 
CHAMPION, June 2003, at 36. 
 71. Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph 
Evidence in the Wake of Daubert:  The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1247, 
1248 (1997). 
 72. See id. at 1250 (“[T]he potential for admissibility of polygraph evidence appears to be 
greater than ever before.”). 
 73. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 203 (“In fact, topics such as bite 
mark and hair identification, fingerprinting, arson investigation, and tool mark analysis have 
a less extensive record of research on accuracy than does polygraph testing.”). 
 74. See Henseler, supra note 71, at 1278–79; see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 
303 (1998) (holding that the bar on polygraph evidence did not violate defendant’s 
constitutional rights); Robin D. Barovick, Comment, Between Rock and a Hard Place:  
Polygraph Prejudice Persists After Scheffer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1533 (1999). 
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than reliability, such as undue prejudice to the jury.75  But courts seemed to 
have gained familiarity with the idea that polygraphs had no place in evidence 
and did not miss them.  Whatever the reason, continued exclusion was the 
path of least resistance. 
The same kind of story easily could play out with regard to novel 
neuroscience.  Like those initial polygraphs, the successful proponents of this 
evidence tend, at this time, to be criminal defendants.76  And like polygraphs, 
novel neuroscience raises concerns about displacing the function of juries 
and confusing the fact-finder; indeed, proposed uses of novel neuroscience 
include lie detection, superseding the polygraph.77  If courts deem such 
evidence insufficiently reliable, perhaps even bolstered by the findings of 
courts in civil cases where such evidence is offered by plaintiffs, then 
exclusion may become the default in much the same way it has with lie 
detection testing, notwithstanding improvements to the technology or error 
rate over time.  In such a scenario, novel neuroscience may go the way of the 
polygraph machine—perhaps operating in the background to inform the 
choices of actors in the system, but never taking its place as full-bodied 
evidence in court, regardless of any gains in the reliability of specific uses. 
2.  The Same Old Story:  
Prosecutors’ Evidence in, Plaintiffs’ Evidence Out 
Of course, the current practice in civil and criminal cases both supports 
and undermines the claim that novel neuroscience may go the way of the 
polygraph.  On the supporting side, courts already seem to show intense 
skepticism toward cutting-edge neuroscientific techniques and have 
generally excluded such evidence.78  Moreover, because such evidence is 
offered almost always by plaintiffs in support of recovery for claims against 
defendants, exclusion is consistent with courts’ historical skepticism of 
plaintiff-proffered novel scientific proof.79  Thus, the general and specific 
patterns point in consistent directions:  toward exclusion of the evidence. 
But undermining the probability of an enduring ban are the cases from the 
criminal context that already dispute that prediction.  Although courts have 
generally excluded novel neuroscience, recall that careful inspection reveals 
one significant exception:  neuroscientific proof offered by defendants in 
sentencing proceedings.80  That suggests both a willingness to embrace some 
role in service of the criminal defendants and not the prosecution. 
 
 75. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 38:5 (discussing “evaluations of 
polygraph evidence”). 
 76. See supra Part II.A. 
 77. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 38:1 n.2 (“[T]here are a multitude of 
other techniques and technologies heralded as the next generation of lie detector.  Principal 
among these competitors might be the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
for this purpose.”). 
 78. See supra Part II.A. 
 79. See supra notes 16–18, 24 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra note 54. 
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Current observations thus only partly conform to the general pattern of 
novel scientific evidence—plaintiffs still remain largely rebuffed, but 
defendants can find some favor with courts.  But the story is not yet fully 
told, because courts, for the most part, have yet to confront the question of 
admitting novel neuroscience when offered by prosecutors.81  It thus may still 
unfold that the customary patterns prove enduring; courts generally exclude 
plaintiffs’ novel neuroscience applying strict admissibility tests, while 
admitting prosecutors’ evidence under a more relaxed standard.  In this case, 
the only surprise would be that defendants will also benefit from such 
evidence when proffered for mitigation purposes. 
This kind of modified status quo is not that unimaginable, as described in 
greater depth below.82  In fact, it is this familiar story that causes many to 
fear that neuroscience represents a “double-edged sword”—what appears on 
its face a boon for criminal defendants, who can claim “my brain did it,” will 
in fact be a weapon for prosecutors, who will use neuroscientific findings to 
argue for the incorrigibility, remorselessness, antisocial tendencies, or 
deviance of defendants. 
3.  The Status Quo, Revised 
A third possibility, however, is that the current trend holds even as 
prosecutors seek to marshal neuroscientific evidence in support of their 
claims.  Courts would extend the general skepticism shown to plaintiffs who 
offer novel techniques to prosecutors, even while continuing to carve out a 
role for the criminal defendant.  It is not quite a ban because criminal 
defendants are permitted limited use.  And again, because prosecutors have 
yet to offer such evidence with regularity, this scenario constitutes pure 
conjecture.  But it may be that the heyday of admission of thinly supported 
 
 81. Professor Denno’s study concludes that prosecutors presently use such evidence “only 
rarely.” Denno, supra note 1, at 499.  Professor Farahany is more equivocal, noting that 
“[p]rosecutors, too, have seized on cognitive neuroscience to argue that defendants are 
incorrigible and should be given longer sentences” and “to denigrate defendants’ characters 
and to demonstrate defendants’ likely future dangerousness.” Farahany, supra note 1, at 4–5.  
But it is unclear whether this refers to arguments made by prosecutors in response to evidence 
offered by the defense and intended as mitigating (e.g., the touted “double-edged sword” of 
neuroscience, in which the defense argues “my brain is defective, spare me” while the 
prosecution counters that “defendant’s brain is defective, incarcerate him”), as opposed to 
those marshaled to support neuroscientific evidence offered ab initio by the prosecutor. See, 
e.g., id. at 21 (recounting prosecutors’ argument to this effect in response to defense evidence).  
In Professor Farahany’s article surveying existing cases, she expounds the facts of cases that 
seem to consist exclusively of defense-offered evidence. See id. at 12, 14–19 (discussing 
competency challenges raised by defense regarding standing trial, tendering a plea, and 
confessing; support for mental illness or mens rea defenses; involuntariness; and sentencing).  
Notably, Professor Denno found that when “prosecutors did utilize neuroscience evidence to 
suggest a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, they typically did so only by building upon 
the evidence first introduced by a defense expert.” Denno, supra note 1, at 526.  She further 
found that only eighty cases contained future dangerousness discussions grounded in 
neuroscience, and only in ten of those was that “neuroscience evidence introduced by the 
defense . . . leveraged by the prosecution in an effort to prove the defendant’s future 
dangerousness.” Id. at 528. 
 82. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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scientific evidence is over, and the kind of rigorous attention given to 
plaintiffs’ evidence will now be given to prosecutors’ evidence as well.  The 
raised awareness of the problem of wrongful conviction, and the prominent 
role that faulty science has played in those injustices,83 could contribute to a 
sense that courts ought to shore up their admissibility standards when it 
comes to novel scientific evidence offered by the government in a criminal 
case.  Recent admonitions against admitting flawed forensics may also cause 
courts to examine such evidence with greater intensity.84 
But if that is the case, and courts roundly reject novel neuroscience, then 
how could current trends permitting defense introduction of such evidence 
hold and not collapse into the total ban scenario?  There is little specific law 
on the operation of scientific admissibility standards as applied to criminal 
defendants as opposed to the prosecution, but what little exists suggests that 
there is no meaningful difference.  While there is some legal support for the 
notion that a defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due 
process may override even rules intended to safeguard evidentiary 
reliability,85 that line of reasoning has long lain fallow.  If so, then Daubert 
should demand as much from criminal defendants as it does from 
prosecutors, and much novel neuroscience would be excluded. 
But why might courts not back away from admission when it comes to 
defense mitigation?  Three reasons. 
First, the mantra that “death is different” is now so familiar that it 
practically needs no citation.86  The Supreme Court consistently has 
distinguished capital cases in its review of the constitutionality of sentences, 
applying a much more robust concept of Eighth Amendment proportionality 
and even the Sixth Amendment right to counsel than evident in noncapital 
cases.  Thus, it would be consistent with this disparity to also admit defense 
neuroscientific evidence that would not have passed muster if offered by the 
prosecution or civil parties. 
Second, this tacit recognition that the Constitution applies differently to 
death cases finds explicit expression in the law of evidentiary admissibility 
for capital mitigation hearings.  The Constitution requires that juries be 
allowed to consider “any relevant mitigating factor”87 offered in a capital 
sentencing hearing, and “virtually no limits are placed on the relevant 
mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own 
 
 83. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:  WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 84–117 (2012). 
 84. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 96–110. 
 85. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284 (1973). 
 86. Nonetheless, Rachel Barkow’s excellent review of the “two tracks” of sentencing law 
provides a helpful primer. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:  The Two Tracks 
of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147 
(2009) (noting courts’ insistence that “death is different” and arguing that it is both legally 
unsupported and theoretically unwise). 
 87. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978)). 
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circumstances.”88  It is also clear that ordinary rules of evidence—which 
typically do not apply in full form during sentencing proceedings in any 
event89—must yield in capital mitigation hearings.90  At the same time, there 
remains debate as to whether and to what extent Daubert, or a similar 
reliability-based standard for expert evidence, applies in the sentencing 
context.91 
Finally, to the extent that the debate centers on introduction of such 
evidence in capital mitigation hearings—as opposed to the sentencing phase 
for noncapital offenses as well—then in practicality it will be an issue in only 
the handful of states that continue to impose the widely rejected sentence of 
capital punishment.92 
In short, it is possible to imagine, and compatible with a commitment to 
the consistent application of legal standards, that novel neuroscientific 
evidence becomes a regular feature of capital mitigation hearings, even if 
rejected for every other proffered use.  Plaintiffs, prosecutors, and other 
litigants (including defendants seeking to use novel neuroscience as proof in 
the liability phase) may continue to meet resistance from courts skeptical that 
 
 88. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).  Note, however, that the Court has 
expressly stated that “relevant” has no special meaning in the capital context. Tennard v. 
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (noting that the evidence must be that which “tends logically 
to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance”). 
 89. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2012) (stating that “[i]nformation is admissible 
regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal 
trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the 
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury”); FED. R. 
EVID. 1101(d)(3).  Interestingly, there have been constitutional challenges to this rule that 
reveal how it operates both to the benefit and detriment of each side.  For instance, it may help 
criminal defendants by permitting less robustly reliable evidence in mitigation, but most 
defense advocates deem the standard as harming defendants because it lessens the bar for the 
reliability of aggravation evidence offered by the prosecution in support of aggravation.  
Challenges along both lines have largely failed. See, e.g., United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 
399 (5th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the Federal Death Penalty Act’s “relaxed evidentiary standard” 
and reaffirming its constitutionality); see also Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Two 
Wrongs Don’t Make a Right:  Federal Death Eligibility Determinations and Judicial 
Trifurcations, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1, 13 (2010).  At the same time, defendants have mounted 
Daubert and Frye challenges to evidence introduced at sentencing, such as to “scientific 
findings” claiming future dangerousness, most often without much success. See infra note 90. 
 90. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that the hearsay rule could not 
serve to exclude testimony during the capital penalty phase); cf. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 
517, 525 (2006) (holding that the Constitution did not grant the right to the defendant to 
introduce innocence-related alibi evidence that undermined conviction during the penalty 
phase). 
 91. Some courts have expressly held that Daubert does not apply, see, e.g., United States 
v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 342 (5th Cir. 2007), while others have simply skirted the issue, see, 
e.g., United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the defense’s 
Daubert-based challenge to “[p]sychopathy checklist” evidence at sentencing without 
resolving the applicability of Daubert); Smithers v. State, 826 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2002) (noting 
conflicting evidence on PET scan without referencing admissibility standards). 
 92. Although nineteen states formally retain the death penalty, only seven states have 
executed an individual in the past two years. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT 
THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last 
updated Aug. 30, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UFQ4-C4YS]. 
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such evidence can meet the threshold showing of reliability, even as criminal 
defendants in mitigation hearings make full use of such evidence. 
4.  Final Thoughts About Spillover Effects 
One final scenario requires elaboration.  Although there are good reasons, 
founded both in law and legal practice, to expect that novel neuroscience will 
initially remain largely cabined to capital mitigation and other serious 
sentencing hearings, it is easy to imagine that mounting pressure would result 
in its adoption in other contexts.  If, in fact, the routine use of novel 
neuroscientific evidence in mitigation hearings were to result in such pressure 
to apply elsewhere, what might that expansion look like?  To what other 
proceedings might it most naturally reach? 
Already, novel neuroscience has had an impact outside of the capital 
sentencing context:  namely, in the noncapital sentencing context, albeit in a 
categorical and nonindividualized way.  In Graham v. Florida93 and Miller 
v. Alabama,94 the Supreme Court relied heavily on neuroscientific studies to 
limit the reach of life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders, based 
on studies showing the immaturity of their brains.  But apart from continuing 
to rely on neuroscience in this categorical fashion—isolating categories for 
addicted persons or the mentally ill, for instance—the real breakthrough 
would be to apply neuroscientific findings to noncapital, individual 
sentencing determinations.  Indeed, Miller opened the door precisely to that 
kind of evidence.  By holding that courts cannot impose mandatory life 
without parole, but must make individualized determinations in the case of 
juveniles,95 the Court opened the door to the consideration of individual 
neuroscientific findings in support of a particular defendant’s claim.  And if 
a juvenile can use brain development as a mitigating factor, why not a twenty-
something-year-old? 
Also, there are already slight signs of prosecutors’ interest in using 
neuroscientific evidence,96 and it is easy to imagine, as many have, the 
myriad ways in which prosecutors might make further use of it in the future.  
It is easiest to imagine such uses in contexts that, like capital sentencing, do 
not suffer from the constraint of strict (or clear) evidentiary rules, such as bail 
hearings, competency determinations, and noncapital sentencing.  Still, other 
proceedings, such as civil commitment hearings predicated on mental illness 
or future dangerousness, may require adherence to Daubert and Frye but not 
require the stringent burden of proof that must be met for criminal 
proceedings. 
 
 93. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  As noted earlier, the Court also held it unconstitutional to execute 
juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
 94. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 95. Id. at 2475. 
 96. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 526 (arguing that the concern is overblown that 
prosecutors will use neuroscientific evidence to bolster arguments of future dangerousness); 
Farahany, supra note 1, at 12–17 (discussing competency). 
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Moreover, as noted earlier, judges who become used to seeing 
neuroscientific proof in capital sentencing hearings may believe, as a matter 
of basic fairness, that the prosecution ought to be permitted to respond in kind 
with its own evidence.  For example, in Professor Farahany’s study of 
criminal cases, she noted that prosecutors do not always respond solely with 
argument to defense efforts to use neuroscientific testing—they sometimes 
use the neuroscientific proof itself to argue against the defendant.97  In such 
cases, “[s]ome of the brain abnormality evidence introduced by a criminal 
defendant at trial can cut against him at a civil commitment hearing,”98 as 
happened in the case of a man who had suffered a serious brain injury that 
purportedly explained his aggression but whose injury prosecutors used to 
also show his incapacity for reform.99 
A kind of “good for the goose, good for the gander” reasoning also appears 
in existing sentencing law.  In Payne v. Tennessee,100 as noted earlier, the 
Supreme Court expressly stated that “virtually no limits are placed on the 
relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning 
his own circumstances.”101  But the Court also added that “[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the 
defendant is entitled to put in.”102  Otherwise, there is “the potential for such 
unfairness.”103  Once the defendant introduces exculpatory neuroscientific 
proof, it seems only natural that courts would allow prosecutors to respond 
in kind.  And when such evidence takes the form of novel neuroscience, 
courts may prove reluctant to reject prosecutorial evidence as insufficiently 
reliable having admitted the same kind of evidence when offered by the 
defense.  In this way, evidence that now serves the interests of defendants, 
propelled to admission by a defendant’s special constitutional rights,104 may 
quickly become precedent relied upon by courts to admit the same kind of 
evidence more broadly, even when offered against the defense.  If so, 
government use of neuroscientific proof could be grandfathered in through 
defense standards that were never that onerous, resulting in a new kind of 
Daubert equilibrium. 
Of course, as courts grow accustomed to hearing neuroscientific evidence 
in bail proceedings, sentencing proceedings, competency determinations, and 
the like, will they remember that such evidence did not have to meet stringent 
hurdles of reliability when confronted with neuroscientific evidentiary 
proffers during the guilt phase of a trial?  Current case reviews suggest that 
 
 97. See Farahany, supra note 1, at 22. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 101. Id. at 822. 
 102. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(reversing exclusion of brain tumor evidence that bolstered entrapment defense); State v. 
Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Tenn. 2009) (reversing exclusion of “toxic encephalopathy” 
evidence that supported the defendant’s claim that he was too cognitively impaired to have 
plotted escape). 
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courts generally reject such evidence, even when offered by the defense, 
although instances of admission occur.105  But will that pattern endure even 
if the science does not meaningfully evolve?  Will it not seem odd to a judge 
to rule evidence unreliable that, in a hearing months earlier, the judge cited 
as part of a basis for a detention decision?  Similarly, it is easy to imagine 
that opinions admitting such evidence at the request of defendants citing 
constitutional values will be successfully cited by prosecutors seeking to 
introduce the same kind of evidence on their own behalf. 
If novel neuroscience gains a foothold in the parts of a criminal case that 
are not characterized by extensive discovery, robust adversarial hearing, or 
formal evidence rules (including Daubert- or Frye-type reliability screens), 
then it will no doubt have an advantage when it first starts cropping up in the 
more demanding phases of adjudication.  Indeed, the lamentable state of 
public defense in the United States suggests that many unfounded 
neuroscientific claims may go altogether unchallenged even if there were 
legitimate legal and scientific bases to keep such evidence out.106 
Finally, might this embrace of novel neuroscientific evidence, once a 
regular feature of criminal cases, eventually bleed over to the civil context as 
well?  Will an opinion that admits evidence of “toxic encephalopathy”107 in 
mitigation become a supportive citation for a motion to admit such evidence 
when offered by a civil plaintiff?  Although the traditional narrative about the 
divide between civil and criminal Daubert suggests that distinctions between 
the two can be maintained, it is not inconceivable that the inroads made in 
the criminal context might ease the path for at least some civil plaintiffs going 
forward.  The same judges that hear neuroscientific evidence in capital cases 
inevitably will preside over other kinds of proceedings, including civil 
matters. 
As such evidence becomes increasingly familiar and judges acclimate to 
its particular vernacular, the novelty of using neuroscientific proof may start 
to wear off and earlier boundaries dissolve.  After all, judges tend to expect 
a baseline of reliability from all evidence.  Even in a capital hearing, most 
judges would not allow the defendant to present an astrologer who would 
testify that the defendant only acted because Mercury was in retrograde.  
Judges may feel a fundamental discomfort with the idea of a discrepancy—
the notion that neuroscience is somehow reliable enough for a death sentence 
determination but not for less serious offenses or monetary claims. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that neuroscientific proof is 
susceptible to motivated reasoning, “the unconscious tendency to assimilate 
 
 105. See, e.g., 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 20:9–:16. 
 106. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 18, at 135 (“When I first started looking at these post-
Daubert cases, I expected to find records of multiple well-litigated attacks on the weakest 
kinds of common prosecution-proffered expertise, with any system bias coming from judicial 
decisions.  What I found was an apparent systematic failure to seriously litigate these issues 
on the part of the criminal defense bar.”). 
 107. See Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d at 375, 381. 
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information in a manner biased towards reaching a particular outcome.”108  
Thus, judges may begin to deem such evidence reliable when it confirms 
other proof, or even their own intrinsic beliefs about a particular condition, 
and incline toward a more generous Daubert or Frye standard in noncapital 
or civil cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Novel neuroscientific evidence now stands at the precipice of the judicial 
system, seeking entry.  But that system’s history of safeguarding scientific 
proof suggests that even if neuroscience is ready, the courts may not be.  On 
the civil side, courts have struggled to show evenhandedness and consistency 
in the degree to which they subject plaintiffs’ evidence to scrutiny, often 
being accused of reserving their most intense oversight for plaintiffs’ 
proffers.  On the criminal side, courts have repeatedly shown themselves 
willing to allow the most spurious forms of “science” when offered by 
prosecutors—with catastrophic consequences. 
The disconnect between these two realities—courts’ leniency toward 
criminal prosecutors and harshness toward civil plaintiffs—has henceforth 
created little overt tension in our appraisal of the rule of law because the 
scientific methods proffered in each category varied markedly.  Apart from 
fire science and handwriting analysis, which have their own unique 
pathologies, the scientific techniques rejected by civil courts had little 
bearing on the methods prosecutors sought to introduce. 
Novel neuroscience, however, may stand alone at the crossroads of civil 
and criminal evidence.  Like lie detection, its closest analogue, novel 
neuroscience offers something of value to both civil and criminal litigants 
and to plaintiffs, prosecutors, and defendants.  As courts confront questions 
of its admissibility, then, they will have to squarely confront the 
demonstrated problem of inconsistent application of admissibility standards.  
What will be the result?  Only time will tell.  But whatever the outcome, 
observers may gain a clearer sense of the successes and failures of our 
evidentiary admissibility standard. 
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